From the departure of the last British regiment in 1870 until 1945 the story of the Australian Army, and its role in Australian society, is primarily one dominated by the contribution of the citizen soldier. Formations and units throughout this period had limited numbers of full-time (or regular) personnel, although the large wartime armies of 1918 and 1945 possessed most of the characteristics of professional regular armies.

Dayton McCarthy’s excellent account explains why this inevitably changed over the three decades following World War II. The book, based on his 1997 PhD thesis, ends with the watershed Millar Report of 1971 and its partial implementation over the next few years. A short postscript summarises key developments until the present day.

This is both a scholarly study and an immensely readable and well-written account. The research is thorough and balanced, and the book fills a significant gap in the historical record. McCarthy’s recounting and assessment of the often disparate views within and without the CMF/Army Reserve are measured and judicious. Most notably he lances most of the mutually antagonistic conspiracy theories expounded by some reservists and regulars.

From the viewpoint of the operational utility of the Army Reserve the book distils and superbly discusses several key themes including:

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      the importance of its reserve component to the Army retaining the intimacy of its links to the wider civil community, both locally and nationally;
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      the continual difficulties in recruiting and retaining junior ranks;
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      the perpetual battle to balance the advantages and disadvantages of centralised versus decentralised (unit) training;
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      the importance of middle-level NCO and junior officers in reserve units;
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      the importance of employer incentives and legislative civilian job protection for military reservists, and the problems continually caused by inadequate measures;
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      the fatal handicap caused by the Defence Act so severely restricting the operational employment of formed reserve units for so long (including the lost opportunity to employ a reserve unit in Vietnam);
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      the bungling of several ‘total Army’ initiatives and schemes over the years; and
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      the mutual suspicions and antagonisms fed by different perceptions of military professionalism, especially the financial cost of reserve units balanced against the legislative restrictions on their employment, that continually handicap relations between the Army’s reservist and full-time components.

McCarthy sets the CMF (and its Army Reserve successor) properly in its historical, cultural and demographic contexts. Two key threads skilfully woven throughout the book are the perpetual problem of populating the junior ranks of reserve units, and the constant decline in the numbers of experienced senior NCO to train and lead them. With only very temporary exceptions such as 1980, when the Fraser Government quickly expanded the Army Reserve but then failed to sustain it, reserve units have only approached full strengths when an element of conscription or unusual incentive has been involved.

In the 1950s national service scheme most 18-year old males underwent three months of full-time training in their first year (with strong echoes of the current system of common induction training) then three years in the active reserve followed by three years in the standby reserve. In the 1964-72 national service scheme, when only one in forty 20-year olds was liable for two years full-time service in the regular army, the CMF was well populated by those potential conscripts who chose the option of serving five years as a reservist instead.

In the early 1990s, the comparatively small Ready Reserve Scheme resembled a form of voluntary national service with financial incentives replacing conscription. Ready Reservists underwent one year of full-time service followed by four years in the active reserve, and such units approached full strength in strong contrast to most general reserve units.

As McCarthy details, the 1950s national service scheme stretched both the Army’s regular and reserve components but there were still enough experienced senior NCO (including 2nd AIF veterans) to make it work. In the 1960s scheme there was less of this senior NCO and junior officer backbone, but enough to generally handle the smaller size of the CMF. By the 1990s the Ready Reserve scheme only succeeded in this regard because of much smaller numbers, the use of regular NCO, and the one year of initial full-time training laying a good base for growing future NCO. The general trend, however, since 1950 has been one of constant decline in overall numbers and especially in experienced reservist senior NCO.

Finally, the book recounts the lamentable delay in the CMF obtaining appropriate conditions of service. Tax-free pay, for example, was only granted in 1964 and civilian job protection and employer incentives were ineffective until the 1990s. McCarthy also records in detail the fatal handicap on Army Reserve morale, development and utility caused by the reluctance of governments until the 1990s to effectively remove the legislative restrictions on its employment.

Dayton McCarthy’s The Once and Future Army is a solid, truly analytical and optimistic appraisal of why the Australian Army should value its reserve component. The book should be compulsory reading for any officer before taking up sub-unit command in either the regular or reserve components of the Army. It is essential reading for any Australian who needs to form a view or make a decision on whether we need an Army Reserve.

This review from Australian Bookseller & Publisher magazine is reproduced by kind permission of Thorpe-Bowker, a division of R R Bowker LLC. © Copyright 2008, Thorpe-Bowker

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